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Abstract
In this study, Professor Lindgren examined data on the 108 confirmed nominees to
the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal from the administrations of George H.W. Bush
and William J. Clinton. He shows - for the first time - evidence of differential treat-
ment of nominees by the American Bar Association’s rating committee. Yet this
is not a simple story of apparent ABA bias toward Clinton nominees. Among con-
firmed nominees with the most important credential - prior judicial experience -
Bush nominees fare roughly as well and sometimes even better than Clinton nom-
inees. The problem arises for those without judicial experience. Here the apparent
preference for Clinton appointees is strikingly large. Without controlling for any
credentials, Clinton confirmed nominees have 9.1 times as high odds of getting
a unanimous well qualified rating as do Bush confirmed nominees. Controlling
for credentials, Clinton nominees have 9.7-15.9 times as high odds of getting a
unanimous well qualified ABA rating as similarly credentialed Bush appointees.
For those without prior judicial experience, just being nominated by Clinton in-
stead of Bush is a stronger positive variable than any other credential or than all
other credentials put together. The differences in how the ABA treats Bush and
Clinton nominees reaches even to the committee’s internal decision making. The
ABA committee split its vote 33% of the time while evaluating Bush appointees,
but only 17% of the time when evaluating Clinton appointees. This difference
was concentrated among those who lacked prior judicial experience, where 50%
of Bush appointees had split ratings, compared to only 10% of Clinton appointees
with split ratings.
Forthcoming in the Journal of Law and Politics (October 2001) 
 
Examining the American Bar Association's 
Ratings of Nominees to the U.S. Courts of 
Appeals for Political Bias, 1989-2000 
 
James Lindgren1 
 
I 
Introduction 
 
 The American Bar Association has been rating federal judges since 
the late 1940s.2  It was first brought into the process for political reasons—to 
reduce the ability of Harry Truman to appoint minorities, women, and 
“leftists.”3  Whether in its judicial ratings the ABA might still be performing 
                                        
1.  Professor of Law; Director of the Demography of Diversity Project; Director of 
Faculty Research; Northwestern University. J.D., 1977, University of Chicago; B.A., 
1974, Yale University; currently Ph.D. Student, Sociology, University of Chicago.  
Chair-Elect, AALS Section on Social Science.  I very much appreciate the helpful 
comments of two friends who were involved in judicial selection—William Marshall in 
the Clinton transition and administration and Stephen Calabresi in the Reagan/Bush 
administrations. 
The data for this project were collected by Leonard Leo, Peter Redpath, and 
Gerarda Walsh of the Federalist Society for the newsletter ABA Watch. I checked four of 
the six credentials variables against the standard academic database and resolved 
differences by going to original sources.  The ABA Watch’s collection and coding was 
substantially more accurate than the standard database.  I am grateful for the willingness 
of Leonard Leo and ABA Watch to share their data with me even before publication.   
My work on political diversity is currently supported by research grants available 
to Northwestern faculty, including summer research funding and a 2001-2002 grant from 
the G.D. Searle Fund.  I would like to thank the Searle Fund and Dean David Van Zandt 
for their financial support. 
I must disclose that I have in the past received substantial funding for my work 
from the American Bar Foundation (ABF), a think tank affiliated with the American Bar 
Association.  From 1979 through 1982, I was a salaried Research Attorney and Project 
Director for the ABF and was the Review Editor of the ABF Research Journal.   
 2.  See Sheldon Goldman, Picking Federal Judges: Lower Court Selection from 
Roosevelt Through Reagan 86-88 (1997); Michael D. Schattman, Article: Picking 
Federal Judges: A Mysterious Alchemy, 96 Mich. L. Rev. 1578, 1584-85 (1998).   
 3.  See Picking Federal Judges, supra note 2, at 86-88; Schattman, supra note 2, at 
1584-85. 
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a political function (though of a different sort) is the question that this study 
examines.   
 
 In recent years, the ABA’s role in rating judges has become 
increasingly controversial,4 but mostly among those who are not academics. 
While professors have noted that Bill Clinton's nominees were more highly 
rated by the ABA than Ronald Reagan's or George H.W. Bush's nominees,5 
scholars usually use this as evidence of how highly qualified the Clinton 
nominees really are.6  Sheldon Goldman and Elliot Slotnick, the political 
scientists who have published more articles discussing the ABA ratings than 
any other academics, recently concluded that the ABA’s special role in the 
pre-nomination reviews of judicial candidates “has for the most part worked 
well for Republican and Democratic administrations over the last half 
                                        
 4.   R. Townsend Davis, Jr., The American Bar Association and 
Judicial Nominees: Advice Without Consent?, 89 Colum. L. Rev. 550 (1989); Kim 
Dayton, Judicial Vacancies and Delay in the Federal Courts: An Empirical Evaluation, 67 
St. John's L. Rev. 757 (1993); Orrin G. Hatch, The Politics of Picking Judges, 6 J.L. & 
Pol. 35 (1989); R. Samuel Paz, Federal District Court Nomination Process: Smears of 
Controversy and Ideological Sentinels,  28 Loy. L.A. L. Rev. 903 (1995). 
 5.  See Sheldon Goldman and Elliot Slotnick, Clinton’s Second Term Judiciary: 
Picking Judges Under Fire, 82 Judicature 265 (1999) (“six years’ worth of Clinton 
appointees yielded the highest proportion of all four administrations receiving the top 
ratings from the Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary of the American Bar 
Association.”); Carl Tobias, Choosing Judges at the Close of the Clinton Administration, 
52 Rutgers L. Rev. 827, 839 (2000)(“Moreover, the American Bar Association gave the 
Clinton nominees the highest rankings since the Bar Association began assessing the 
competence of candidates . . . .”); Carl Tobias, Judicial Selection  at the Clinton 
Administration's End, 19 Law & Ineq. J. 159, 167-68 (2001)(“Moreover, the ABA 
assigned sixty-three percent of the nominees whom the President tendered the highest 
ranking as well qualified; this number was ten percentage points greater than the ratings 
earned by those lawyers whose names the Reagan and Bush Administrations 
submitted.”). 
 6.  See Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerald Gryski, and Gary Zuk, Clinton’s 
Judges: Summing Up the Legacy, 84 Judicature 228, 245 (2001) (“Measures of the 
quality of the appointees are subjective; however, whatever their flaws, the ABA ratings 
are seen by most observers as a rough measure of how leading members of the bar and 
bench view the candidates for judicial positions.  By this measure, the Clinton 
administration’s overall record yielded the highest quality judiciary since the ABA began 
its rating system.”); id. at 248.  See also Sheldon Goldman, Elliot Slotnick, Gerald 
Gryski, and Gary Zuk, Recent Clinton Nominees, 84 Judicature 232 (2001) (“During 
1999 and 2000 there were a number of Clinton appointees with particularly strong 
professional credentials who also received the highest ABA rating of ‘well qualified.’”) 
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century.”7  The conservative grumblings about possible ABA political 
favoritism recently led the White House to end the ABA’s privileged 
position in screening candidates before nomination, despite the allegations 
being largely impressionistic and anecdotal.   
 
 Without controlling for background credentials, one cannot make 
even a good circumstantial case for the existence of political bias in rating 
the qualifications of judges.  Even with good control variables for many 
important qualifications, still one does not prove bias with statistics.  One at 
most shows data consistent with the hypothesis that there is bias.  This study 
does precisely that. 
 
 The dawn of a new administration is a good time to assess aspects of 
the last one.  For comparison with the Clinton administration, I examined 
data from the first Bush administration, that of George H.W. Bush.  After 
examining data on nominees to the U.S. Circuit Courts of Appeal over these 
two administrations, this study shows—for the first time—strong evidence 
of differential treatment of nominees by the ABA's rating committee.  This 
study compares the ABA ratings to the credentials of the 108 men and 
women nominated and confirmed for the U. S. Courts of Appeals during the 
last two presidential administrations (including one recess appointment).  I 
have no data on those who were not confirmed, so I do not know whether 
the patterns in these data are stronger or weaker for them.    
 
 The task of evaluating the credentials of judges has been undertaken 
by the Association’s 15-member Standing Committee on the Federal 
Judiciary. The ABA rates judges as Well Qualified, Qualified, or Not 
Qualified.  Judges who receive a "Not Qualified" rating would not ordinarily 
be viable candidates to get through Senate confirmation.  The ABA 
committees often split their votes on the ratings, so it is possible to get, for 
example, a majority of the ABA committee voting "Qualified" and a 
minority voting "Not Qualified."  Effectively, this particular split rating is 
the lowest one that would give a judge a reasonable chance of getting 
appointed and the lowest rating that I found in these data. 
 
 The credentials used by the ABA are set out in numerous public 
statements, articles, and booklets. The ABA-published booklet on the ratings 
process states, “The Committee’s evaluation of prospective nominees…is 
                                        
 7.  See Clinton’s Judges, supra note 6, at 254 n.17. 
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directed to professional qualifications—integrity, professional competence 
and judicial temperament.”8 
 
 As for integrity, the ABA notes, “The prospective nominee’s 
character and general reputation in the legal community are investigated, as 
are his or her industry and diligence.”9  Professional competence 
“encompasses such qualities as intellectual capacity, judgment, writing and 
analytical ability, knowledge of the law and breadth of professional 
experience.”10  For appellate court nominees, the ABA states that “the 
Committee may place somewhat less emphasis on the importance of trial 
experience as a qualification,”11 yet appellate nominees “should possess an 
especially high degree of scholarship and academic talent and an unusual 
degree of overall excellence.”12  Regarding judicial temperament, the ABA 
states that the Committee “considers the prospective nominee’s compassion, 
decisiveness, openmindedness, sensitivity, courtesy, patience, freedom from 
bias, and commitment to equal justice.”13 
 
 Some of the qualifications that are reviewed by the ABA to assess 
professional experience, competence, and intellect can be measured 
empirically. Most of the variables examined in this study are both important 
in themselves (such as having judicial or practice experience) and important 
markers of intellectual or other sorts of ability (such as attending an elite law 
school or serving on law review).  Some of the ratings criteria, however, 
cannot be measured empirically, such as integrity and judicial temperament. 
Seven of the nine variables I used as predictors are staples of other studies of 
the judicial nomination process (judicial experience, top 10 law school, 
private practice, government practice, race, gender, and nominating 
president).  The two new predictor variables (law review and federal 
clerkship) favor Clinton’s candidates, so their inclusion tends to explain a 
                                        
8.  American Bar Association, Standing Committee on Federal Judiciary: What It 
Is and How It Works 3 (March 1991).  See Also Roberta Cooper Ramo and N. Lee 
Cooper, The American Bar Association's Integral Role In The Federal Judicial Selection 
Process: Excerpted Testimony Of Roberta Cooper Ramo and N. Lee Cooper Before The 
Judiciary Committee Of The United States Senate, May 21, 1996, 12 St. John's J.L. 
Comm. 93 (1996).   
 9.  See ABA, Standing Committee, supra note 8, at 3. 
 10.  Id.   
11.  Id. at 4.  
 12.  Id.   
 13.  Id.   
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small part of the observed differences between Clinton and Bush nominees. 
Without the two new variables, the apparent political bias in the data would 
have been even worse.   
 
The data in this study were collected by ABA Watch, a newsletter that 
evaluates the activities of the ABA,14 and supplied to me for analysis.  I 
checked over 70% of the data against other published databases and sources.  
ABA Watch collected information about the professional qualifications of 
confirmed judicial nominees, using primarily publicly available sources such 
as the Federal Judicial Center’s web site, ABA archives and annual reports, 
law reviews, and online professional and academic databases. If necessary, 
they contacted judges directly to fill gaps in publicly available information. 
Specifically, in addition to the ABA ratings, ABA Watch coded the 
following credentials: 
 
• Whether the nominee served as a private practitioner.15 
• Whether the nominee served as a government lawyer. 
• Whether the nominee had already served as a judge. 
• Whether the nominee attended a law school ranked as one of the 10 
best in the current rankings from U.S. News and World Report.   
• Whether the nominee served on law review while in law school. 
• Whether the nominee had served as a law clerk to a federal judge. 
 
 Examining data on confirmed nominees to the U.S. Courts of Appeal 
over the last two administrations, I found significant differences in how the 
ABA Standing Committee evaluated the professional qualifications of Bush 
and Clinton appointees. While making simple comparisons between the 
credentials of Clinton and Bush nominees, I found only three statistically 
significant differences: (1) Clinton confirmed nominees are more likely to be 
minorities (27%) than are Bush nominees (10%)16;  (2) for those who lacked 
prior judicial experience, the ABA committee split its votes more often for 
                                        
 14.  ABA Watch is a project of the Federalist Society.   
15.  As for the length of practice, I performed analyses with linear and transformed 
nonlinear predictor variables using the number of years of each type of practice.  The 
coefficients for the Clinton/Bush nominee variable are roughly similar when controlling 
for the length of time in practice.  See Appendix Table 11 for one of these models. 
 16.  Significance using exact versions of various tests (Gamma, Pearson’s R, 
Pearson chi-square, Spearman correlation, and Likelihood ratio chi-square) met the .05 
criterion: .029.    
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Bush appointees (50%) than for Clinton appointees (10%);17 and (3) for 
candidates without judicial experience, Bush appointees received lower 
ABA ratings.18  Among those without prior judicial experience, the 
differences were stark: 65% of Clinton nominees received the ABA’s 
highest rating compared to 17% of Bush nominees.19 
 
II 
Are Democratic Nominees Favored by the ABA? 
 
 The ABA appears to have used very different measurable criteria for 
evaluating Clinton appointees to the federal appellate bench than those used 
for evaluating G.H.W. Bush’s candidates.  Bush appellate appointees who 
were lower court judges appear to have been equally treated compared to 
Clinton appointees.20  Indeed, Bush nominees got an insignificant, 
advantage.  But among those without the central qualification—prior judicial 
experience—the Clinton appointees appeared to get an extremely strong 
boost just for being appointed by Bill Clinton, rather than some guy named 
Bush.  
  
 Extensive data analysis revealed different patterns for evaluating 
Clinton and Bush appointees.  Logically, the most important credential for 
being a judge is already being a judge.  Further, it is unlikely that either 
party would tend to elevate the worst judges among the many already in the 
profession.  Thus, being a judge was a strong positive credential—both 
theoretically and in parts (but not all) of our data.  Further, the ABA showed 
no substantial differences one way or the other in evaluating candidates who 
were former judges; Bush lower court judges fared about as well as Clinton 
                                        
 17.  Significance met the .05 criterion: gamma (.021), Pearson’s R (.003), Pearson 
chi-square (.003), Spearman correlation (.003), and Likelihood ratio chi-square (.004).  
18.  The Clinton nominees did not fare better because of any supposed affirmative 
action, because the data did not suggest that any existed. Minority Clinton nominees got 
slightly lower ABA ratings than their credentials would predict. Minority Bush nominees 
got much lower ratings than their credentials would predict. Compare Tables 9 and 10 in 
the Appendix (column B). 
 19.  Significance was easily met for those without judicial experience: gamma 
(.001), Pearson’s R (.002), Pearson chi-square (.002), Spearman correlation (.002), and 
Likelihood ratio chi-square (.002).   
 20.  See infra Appendix, Tables 6-8.   
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lower court judges in ABA ratings for open federal appellate posts—in some 
statistical models insignificantly better.21 
 
 The interesting pattern is among those candidates who were not 
already judges.  Here, since the candidate lacked the most obvious credential 
for the job, the ABA committee’s evaluations can be more subjective.  Here 
Clinton nominees fared strikingly better than Bush nominees. For example, 
without judicial experience, 65% of Clinton appointees were unanimously 
rated well qualified, while only 17% of the Bush appointees were so rated.   
 
 I used data on six credentials that are either important in themselves or 
good indicators of other important credentials: (1) judicial experience, (2) an 
elite law school education, (3) law review, (4) a federal court clerkship, (5) 
private practice experience, and (6) government practice experience. Chart 1 
shows how the ABA rated those nominees without prior judicial experience, 
but with different numbers of the other credentials. 
 
 As you can see from this simple presentation of data in Chart 1, 
without judicial experience Clinton nominees with few credentials are rated 
much better (61% of the less qualified get the highest rating) than Bush 
nominees with more credentials (only 20% of the more qualified get the 
highest rating). Further, as the credentials of Clinton nominees improved, 
their chances of getting the highest rating changed only slightly—from 61% 
to 69%.  That indicates that the evaluation process for Clinton appointees is 
not driven by measurable credentials.  Breadth of experience has little effect 
on the ratings of Clinton appointees.   
 
                                        
 21.  See infra Chart 4; Appendix, Tables 6-8.   
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Chart 1: % of Appellate Nominees Getting a "Well 
Qualified" ABA Rating With Any of 5 Credentials 
(Private Practice, Government Practice, Top 10 School,
Law Review, Federal Clerkship)
1989-2000 Confirmed Nominees With No Prior Judicial Experience, n=49
Bush
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Clinton
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Clinton
61%
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30%
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 To perform more sophisticated analyses controlling for credentials, 
researchers like to predict the relative odds of a particular outcome. 22  Here 
about 9 Clinton appointees are rated “Well Qualified” for every 5 who are 
rated less qualified—a 65% to 35% probability translates into a 9 to 5 odds 
of being "Well Qualified.”  For Bush appointees, 1 appointee is rated "Well 
Qualified" for every 5 rated lower than that (a 17% to 83% probability 
translates into about 1 to 5 odds of being rated "Well Qualified").  Stated 
another way, the odds of getting a "Well Qualified" rating are 9.1 times 
higher for Clinton appointees than for Bush appointees.  For every five  
lower rated candidates, Bush would get only one highly rated candidate; 
Clinton would get nine.23  
 
I then did logistic regression analysis to predict the odds of receiving 
the highest rating. When one controls for other credentials, the pattern of 
preference for Clinton appointees just gets stronger. If one adds in control 
variables for practice experience as either a private or government 
attorney—among those without judicial experience Clinton appointees had 
9.7 times greater odds of getting the highest ABA rating than similarly 
qualified Bush I appointees (Table 1).  Just being nominated by Clinton 
instead of Bush is better than any other credential or than all other 
credentials put together.24   
                                        
 22.  Odds-ratios (and log odds-ratios) are the staple of categorical data analysis in 
the social sciences—being the heart of both logistic regression analysis and loglinear 
analysis. Although less intuitive than percentages for all but frequent gamblers, odds-
ratios and log odds-ratios have more powerful statistical properties for modeling ratios.   
 23.  Here is a more precise version of the computations for appointees without 
judicial experience.  Comparing a 64.52% rate of highest ABA ratings for Clinton 
appointees with a 16.67% rate for Bush appointees, the precise relative odds are 
computed as: (.6452/(1-.6452))/(.1667/(1-.1667)=9.1 to 1.  Thus the odds of a Clinton 
appointee without judicial experience getting a well qualified rating are 9.1 times higher 
than the odds of a Bush appointee without judicial experience getting the same rating.   
 24.  Indeed, the influence of the other credentials is negative in the model (see 
column “B”).  
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Table 1 
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating 
From the ABA Without Judicial Experience  
But With Several Predictors:  
Experience in Private Practice or as a Government Lawyer 
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-2000 
 
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=49) 
 
Dependent Variable: Well Qualified Rating 
 
 -2 Log Likelihood     56.145 
 Goodness of Fit       48.343 
 Cox & Snell - R^2       .211 
 Nagelkerke - R^2        .281 
 Significance               .009 
        
        
        
Variable  B (log-odds) S.E. Signif.  R  Exponent of B (odds) 
       
Clinton Nominee 2.277  .753 .003 .355  9.743 
Private Practice  -.580          1.053 .582 .000    .560 
Govt. Lawyer   -.171  .654 .793 .000    .843 
Constant           -1.053          1.088 .334   
 
 
 
 Because this database contains all the nominated and confirmed 
judges, not a sample of them, statistical significance is literally meaningless.  
Significance testing is designed to assess the degree of confidence one can 
have that estimates obtained from a sample will approach the true 
parameters of the population from which they were drawn.  Thus, little 
weight should be given to statistical significance here, since our means are 
exactly the population means.  What is important here are the strength of 
relationships and the explanatory power of variables. 
 
 Nonetheless, the computed significance of this model is .009, easily 
meeting the standard .05 significance level.  The computed significance of 
any variable is shown in the “Signif.” column; being a Clinton nominee v. a 
Bush nominee is significant at the .003 level.  The column “R” shows a high 
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pseudo-R25 of .355.  The column “Exponent of B” (exponent of  the 
coefficient in the “B” column) shows the relative odds of being a Clinton 
nominee v. a Bush nominee (here 9.7 times).  The “B” column is the 
increase or decrease in the log of the odds of being rated well qualified 
associated with any particular variable.  A logistic regression equation is 
based on fitting a constant and each variable and its log-odds (using data in 
the second column of the table).26   
 
When one controls for experience as a federal court clerk, attending 
an elite (top 10) law school, and serving on law review, the preference for 
Clinton appointees gets stronger still. Now controlling for all measured 
credentials, Clinton appointees without judicial experience have 10.5 times 
greater odds of getting a well qualified rating from the ABA than Bush 
appointees (Table 2).  As in Table 1, just being nominated by Clinton instead 
of Bush is better than any other credential or than all other credentials put 
together.   
 
Applying this model fitting the data, consider a fairly well qualified 
appointee with private and government practice experience, federal clerkship 
experience, law review, and a J.D. from an elite law school.  If that person 
were nominated by Clinton, she would have an 60% probability of getting 
the ABA’s highest rating.  If that person were instead nominated by Bush, 
she would have only a 13% probability of getting the highest rating. 
 
Or consider a less qualified candidate.  Assume that he has private 
practice experience and no other standard credential.  He could expect a 67% 
chance of getting the ABA’s highest rating if he were a Clinton nominee, but 
only a 16% chance if he were a Bush appointee, despite having identical 
mediocre credentials.
                                        
 25.  This pseudo-R is roughly equivalent to R, a standardized correlation 
coefficient in linear regression. 
 26.  Each variable is coded “1” if the credential is present, “0” if the credential is 
not present.  The logistic regression equation in Table 1 is:  
y=-1.053+(2.277*Clinton Nominee)+(-.580*Private Pract)+(-.171*Govt Lawyer). 
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Table 2 
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating 
From the ABA Without Judicial Experience  
But With Several Predictors:  
Politics, Federal Clerkship, Elite Law School, Law Review, and 
Practice Experience 
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-2000 
 
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=49) 
 
Dependent Variable: Well Qualified Rating 
    
 -2 Log Likelihood       53.41    
Goodness of Fit          46.33   
Cox & Snell - R^2          .254   
Nagelkerke - R^2           .338  
Significance        .026 
 
Variable B (log-odds) S.E. Signif.  R  Exponent of B (odds) 
        
Clinton Nominee 2.354  .800 .003 .345  10.527 
Private Practice  -.741          1.177 .529 .000      .476 
Govt. Lawyer  -.343  .682 .615 .000       .710 
Top 10 JD               -1.094  .778 .160 .000       .335 
Law Review   .459  .738 .534 .000     1.583 
Fed. Clerkship   .679  .738 .358 .000     1.972 
Constant  -.895          1.316 .497 
   
 
But perhaps there is something else going on here.  Perhaps minority 
and female appointees have less traditional credentials.  Since Clinton 
appointed more females and minorities than Bush, perhaps I should control 
for being minority or female (even though they are not credentials per se).  
In Table 3 I do just that.  When one controls for being minority or female 
and all measured credentials, the Clinton appointees have 9.9 times higher 
odds of receiving the highest rating from the ABA.  As in Tables 1-2, for 
those without judicial experience, just being nominated by Clinton instead of 
Bush is better than any other credential or than all other credentials put 
together.   
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In evaluating those who lack judicial experience, the pattern of 
apparent preference for Democrats is extremely strong and consistent for all 
models with various control variables.  When one controls for relevant 
credentials, such as education and work experience, the ABA preference for 
Clinton appointees just gets trivially stronger. 
 
 
 
Table 3 
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating 
From the ABA Without Judicial Experience 
But With Several Predictors: 
Politics, Federal Clerkship, Elite Law School, Law Review, 
Practice Experience, Gender, and Ethnicity 
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-2000 
 
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=49) 
 
Dependent Variable: Well Qualified Rating 
 
-2 Log Likelihood 53.197 
Goodness of Fit 46.367 
Cox & Snell R^2    .257 
Nagelkerke R^2    .343 
Significance     .069 
 
 
Variable B (log-odds)  S.E.  Signif. R     Exponent of B (odds) 
        
Clinton Nominee 2.289  .807  .005  .337    9.862 
Private Practice -.818  1.172  .485  .000      .441 
Govt. Lawyer  -.276    .706  .696  .000      .759 
Top 10 JD          -1.093  .814  .179  .000      .335 
Law Review   .481  .803  .549  .000    1.617 
Fed. Clerkship  .667  .745  .371  .000    1.947 
Female   .423  1.069  .692  .000    1.527 
Minority   .397  1.440  .783  .000    1.488 
Constant  -.902  1.300  .488   
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III 
Were Different Criteria Used to Evaluate 
Bush and Clinton Nominees? 
 
 The widely different ratings given to Bush and Clinton appointees 
with the same measured credentials suggest a different set of criteria used to 
evaluate Bush and Clinton appointees.  That possibility is explored in this 
section.   
 
Running separate logistic regression equations for Bush and Clinton 
appointees reveals different patterns of evaluation.  If one looks first at the 
Bush appointees, one sees a striking pattern.  Without judicial experience, 
Bush appointees have little hope of getting a “Well Qualified” rating from 
the ABA.  While it is logical that judicial experience would be the pre-
eminent credential, the strength of the relationship is surprising.  For Bush 
appointees, being a judge increases the relative odds of getting the highest 
rating by over 1,300 percent (14.8 times greater odds).  If a Bush appointee 
does not have prior judicial experience, however, the ABA appears to start 
with a strong presumption that the candidate is not “Well Qualified.” 
 
 Bush appointees without measurable credentials start at an extremely 
strong disadvantage (a probability of 5% of getting the highest rating).27  
Then one credential—judicial experience—counts strongly to move Bush 
appointees toward obtaining a “Well Qualified” rating.  It is the only 
variable that is statistically significant and the only variable that 
substantially drives the explanatory power of the model. For example, being 
a judge raises the initial probability of receiving the highest ABA rating 
from 5% to 45%.28  Each other credential moves the candidate toward higher 
ratings (except for attending an elite law school, which has a small negative 
effect).  Having private practice experience would increase the probability of 
a high rating from the starting point of 5% to only 10%.   
 
In other words, for Bush appointees credentials are very important 
predictors of high ratings (as they logically should be).  The model is 
statistically significant despite the small number of cases.  While the 
                                        
 27.  The constant of –2.907 in the 2nd  column can be converted to a probability of 
5%.   
 28.  If you sum the constant (-2.907) and the coefficient B (2.697) for judicial 
experience, you get -.21, which translates to a probability of 45%.   
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measured disadvantage for not having prior judicial experience seems much 
too large to be justified on policy grounds, the process is roughly 
bureaucratically rational in the Weberian sense.  Those without any of the 
traditional credentials have little hope of getting a top rating from the ABA.  
As credentials improve, the ratings of Bush appointees rise.  Although very 
harsh for those lacking judicial experience, the ABA process for Bush 
candidates is based on measurable credentials that the ABA considers 
important—practice experience, educational background, and especially 
judicial experience. 
 
 
 
Table 4 
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating 
From the ABA For Bush Nominees 
With Several Predictors: 
Judicial Experience, Federal Clerkship, Elite Law School, 
Law Review, And Practice Experience 
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-1992 
 
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=42) 
 
Dependent Variable: Well Qualified Rating 
 
-2 Log Likelihood 44.838   
Goodness of Fit 42.728   
Cox & Snell R^2     .266   
Nagelkerke R^2     .356   
Significance      .043 
 
Variable   B (log-odds) S.E. Signif.   R    Exponent of B (odds) 
        
Judicial Exp.  2.697   .918 .003    .379   14.829 
Private Practice   .714     1.210 .555    .000     2.042 
Govt. Lawyer    .443   .819 .589    .000     1.558 
Top 10 JD   -.245   .770 .750    .000       .783 
Law Review    .610     1.043 .558    .000     1.841 
Fed. Clerkship   .617          1.050 .557    .000     1.853 
Constant      -2.907     1.486 .051   
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 For Clinton appointees to the federal appellate bench, the pattern is 
somewhat different—experience matters much less than it should.  Here 
Clinton appointees without any measured credentials start off with a very 
strong presumption (a 48% probability) that they are “Well Qualified.”  On 
balance, credentials do not increase the odds of getting the highest ABA 
rating by as much as would seem reasonable.  Moreover, the model has very 
poor explanatory power.  Judicial experience logically should be a strong 
positive credential, but it is instead an insignificant influence on ABA 
ratings for Clinton appointees.   
 
 
Table 5 
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating 
From the ABA For Clinton Nominees 
With Several Predictors: 
Judicial Experience, Federal Clerkship, Elite Law School,  
Law Review, and Practice Experience 
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1993-2000 
 
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=66) 
-2 Log Likelihood 84.176   
Goodness of Fit 65.871   
Cox & Snell R^2     .050   
Nagelkerke R^2     .068   
Significance      .757 
 
Variable   B (log-odds) S.E. Signif.    R    Exponent of B (odds) 
        
Judicial Exp.    .067   .589 .909    .000   1.070 
Private Practice  -.123   .781 .875    .000     .885 
Govt. Lawyer    .505   .544 .353    .000   1.658 
Top 10 JD   -.120   .545 .826    .000     .887 
Law Review     .286   .585 .625    .000   1.331 
Fed. Clerkship    .815   .603 .176    .000   2.259 
Constant     -.096     1.032 .926   
 
 
 
This table’s data are disturbing because the influence of credentials 
(the “B” column and the “R” column) is weak, accounting for trivial 
amounts of the variance in the data.  Measured credentials should increase 
one’s ABA ratings substantially, but they don’t.  It is as if the ABA 
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evaluated Bush appointees according to measured credentials, but for 
Clinton appointees, experience had little influence on what are subjective 
judgments reached on other grounds.  The process for evaluating Clinton 
nominees does not appear to be bureaucratically rational in the rough 
Weberian sense. 
 
 Consider this example applying the Bush and Clinton logistic 
regression models (Tables 4 and 5).  Which nominee would you expect to be 
more likely to get a “Well Qualified” rating?  According to the statistical 
model fitting the data, Clinton nominees without relevant measurable 
credentials rate higher than Bush nominees with extensive relevant 
experience: 
 
 Clinton Nominee Bush Nominee 
 
 NO Elite Law School JD Elite (Top 10) Law School JD 
 NO Federal Court Clerkship Federal Court Clerkship 
   NO Law Review Experience Law Review Experience 
 NO Private Practice Private Practice  
 NO Government Practice Government Practice  
 
 Probability of Highest Rating: 48% Probability of Highest Rating: 32% 
 
Amazingly, a Bush appointee with good credentials— both private 
and government practice experience, a top-10 law school education, law 
review experience, and a federal court clerkship—has a lower probability 
(32%) of getting the highest ABA rating than a Clinton appointee who has 
none of these credentials (48% chance).  If a Clinton nominee had any one 
of these five credentials, he would have at least a 45% chance of getting the 
highest rating.  If a nominee had all five credentials, she would have a 77% 
chance if she were a Clinton nominee and a 32% chance if she were a Bush 
nominee. 
 
 Based on a comparison of the relative odds corresponding to the 
coefficients of the constants between the Bush and Clinton models (Tables 4 
and 5), for candidates with no measured credentials the odds of a Clinton 
appointee getting a “Well Qualified” ABA rating are a staggering 16.6 times 
higher than for a Bush appointee.  Converting relative odds to probabilities, 
if a Clinton appointee with no measured credentials has a 48% chance of 
getting the highest ABA rating, an identically unqualified Bush appointee 
would have only a 5% chance of getting the top ABA rating.  It is rare to see 
a nonobvious relationship of this size in the social sciences.  
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 Chart 2: Chances of Getting a "Well Qualified" ABA 
Rating by Specific Credentials of U.S. Court of Appeals 
Nominees by Presidential Administration
1989-2000 Confirmed Nominees, model Ns=66+42
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 Of course, neither president is appointing completely unqualified 
nominees.29 Thus, this last comparison of seemingly unqualified candidates 
is more theoretical than actual. What these stark model effects really reflect 
is that, for Bush appointees, credentials (particularly judicial experience) 
really matter in raising their chances for a higher rating. For Clinton 
appointees, on the other hand, ratings do not turn much on their measured 
professional credentials. It is enough to have been recommended by Bill 
Clinton. 
 
 What about more common sets of credentials? In Charts 3 and 4, I 
present the nine most common sets of actual credentials that the nominated 
judges presented for ABA evaluation (4 to 9 nominees presented each set of 
credentials). Computing the probabilities of several sets of credentials using 
the Clinton and Bush logistic regression equations in Tables 4 and 5, we see 
two very different patterns. For those without judicial experience, Clinton 
nominees have much better chances of getting the highest ABA rating of 
unanimously well qualified (Chart 3).  
 
For those with judicial experience, however, the Bush nominees are 
treated somewhat better than the Clinton nominees in all models that include 
private practice experience (Chart 4). That is because the strongest positive 
variable for Bush appointees is judicial experience, while the strongest 
negative credential for Clinton appointees is private practice experience. In 
the one model in Chart 4 without private practice, Clinton appointees have a 
trivially higher probability of getting the highest ABA rating—unanimously 
well qualified.  In the other models, Bush nominees are actually advantaged 
by 11-16%, though these moderately substantial effects are small enough to 
be statistically insignificant. 
                                        
29.  Two of the three Clinton nominees with only one of the six credentials got the 
highest “Well Qualified” rating (67%), while only one of the five Bush nominees with a 
single credential was rated “Well Qualified” (20%). 
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Chart 3: Chances of Getting a "Well Qualified" ABA 
Rating by Specific Credentials of U.S. Court of Appeals 
Nominees by Presidential Administration
Most Common Sets of Credentials (excluding Judicial Experience)
1989-2000 Confirmed Nominees, model Ns=66+42
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Chart 4: Chances of Getting a "Well Qualified" ABA 
Rating by Specific Credentials of U.S. Court of Appeals 
Nominees by Presidential Administration
Most Common Sets of Credentials (including Judicial Experience)
1989-2000 Confirmed Nominees, model Ns=66+42
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IV 
Policy Implications 
 
The policy question of how to use ABA ratings in evaluating 
nominees for appointment naturally arises. Yet this is not a social science 
question; statistical information cannot tell us what the White House, the 
U.S. Senate, or the ABA should do. There is no reason in this study to 
question the validity of ABA ratings of Republican nominees with lower 
court judicial experience. They do just fine. As for the ratings of nominees 
with no lower court experience, however, the patterns revealed in the data 
are consistent with a conclusion of strong political bias favoring Democrats. 
While a cautious academic would not determine conclusively that such a 
bias exists, neither would a cautious academic likely favor continuing to use 
the results of an evaluative process that seems to be so strongly biased.  This 
is not a problem of a few percentage points here or there; the effect sizes are 
extremely large. Nonetheless, one should always be cautious in drawing 
conclusions, especially where there are important unmeasured variables not 
in the models, such as integrity or judicial temperament. 
 
The process of evaluating Clinton nominees cannot be shown to bear 
any logical relation to some of the criteria that the ABA purports to use. If 
the ABA’s highly subjective process is somehow consistent with ABA 
standards, it would have to be because differences in unmeasured criteria 
(e.g., integrity and judicial temperament) are so huge, important, and 
identifiable that they entirely swamp the measured criteria of judicial 
experience, law school background, and legal practice experience. Not only 
does that seem extraordinarily unlikely, but whether such a sanguine state of 
affairs exists is a matter of faith, not evidence.  
   
The business of evaluating prospective judges is not driven by 
academic standards; decisions must be made. One obvious policy response 
would be for the ABA to cease rating judges until it can eliminate the 
apparent bias or show that no bias exists. Another approach might be for the 
Senate, the White House, and the press to de-emphasize or ignore entirely 
the ABA ratings because of probable political bias.  The White House of 
George W. Bush recently ended a long-standing practice of allowing the 
ABA to pre-screen judicial candidates, but the Democratic-controlled Senate 
Judiciary Committee has vowed not to hold any hearings until it has 
reviewed the ABA’s ratings. 
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Another possible approach would be to adjust the Republican ratings 
for the measured amount of observed preference for Democrats.30 I 
tentatively suggest how this probable bias can be quantified in usable terms. 
The committee decisions are sometimes unanimous. Other times, they are 
split—such as between “Qualified” and “Well Qualified”—necessitating 
some combinations of ratings. Consider the following 4-point scale of ABA 
ratings: 
 
0—Not Qualified/Qualified (split) 
1—Qualified (unanimous) 
2—Qualified/Well Qualified (split) 
3—Well Qualified (unanimous) 
 
Multiple linear regression analysis can provide an estimate of the 
amount of apparent political discrimination present in the data.31  For those 
candidates without judicial experience, controlling for all measured 
credentials, the mean ABA bias effect is .9 rating point, rounded to the 
nearest tenth of a point. In other words, Bush nominees are rated nearly one 
point lower than Clinton nominees with the same level of measured 
credentials.   
 
For example, assume a Bush nominee was rated with a split decision 
between “Qualified” and “Well Qualified” (coded at 2 points). After 
correcting for the ABA bias effect by adding .9 points, he or she could be 
considered by the Senate as having 2.9 points, nearly the equivalent of a 
Clinton nominee with the highest rating of unanimously “Well Qualified,” 
rated at 3 points. No bias adjustment is necessary for Republican nominees 
with prior judicial experience, who appeared to have received measurably 
fair treatment from the ABA in the 1989-92 period.  
 
What might the ABA do to eliminate the apparent bias?  The most 
obvious solution is not without problems: its evaluation committee could be 
explicitly balanced by party affiliation. But the goal should be nonpartisan 
ABA evaluations, not bipartisan ABA evaluations. Bipartisan committees 
might result in more split evaluations and a different role for committee 
members who might think that they are supposed to represent their party’s 
interests.  
                                        
 30.  This study modeled the party of the president, not the party of the nominee.   
 31.  See infra Appendix, Table 11.   
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Certainly, the ABA should monitor the results of its evaluative 
process of judicial nominees in the current Bush administration to see if the 
ABA has fallen back into its old ways: the hard, skeptical approach that it 
used to evaluate the credentials of nominees in the first Bush administration 
but dropped when Bill Clinton took office. The ABA should be particularly 
careful not to replicate what appears to have been its especially harsh 
treatment of minority Republican nominees from the first Bush 
administration (compared to their credentials).32   
 
Rooting out political bias is more difficult than it might seem. There 
are no quick fixes. But if the ABA cannot overcome its apparent political 
biases (or plausibly demonstrate that they do not exist), the ABA should 
reluctantly withdraw from the process of rating federal court nominees. At 
the end of the day, one nagging question remains: why didn’t the ABA itself 
see the extraordinarily large political differences in its evaluative processes 
and work harder to understand, explain, or eliminate them?   
 
 
V 
Conclusion 
 
The American Bar Association’s ratings of nominees to the U.S. 
Court of Appeals reveal some disturbing patterns. Yet this is not a simple 
story of apparent ABA bias toward Clinton nominees. The patterns are more 
complex than that. Among nominees with the most important credential—
prior judicial experience—Clinton nominees are not favored over Bush 
nominees; Bush nominees fare roughly as well and sometimes even better 
than Clinton nominees (though the differences are not large enough to be 
statistically significant). In some cases involving particular sets of 
credentials, the probability that a Bush nominee might get the highest ABA 
                                        
32.  See infra Table 9.  Bush minority appointees were 11 times more likely than 
white Bush appointees with identical credentials to get a rating below unanimously well 
qualified.  Because of the low number of Bush minority nominees, this effect was not 
statistically significant (p=.14).  The suggestion that minorities get lower ABA ratings 
than their credentials would predict has been made before.  Roger E. Hartley, Senate 
Delay of Minority Judicial Nominees: A Look at Race, Gender, and Experience, 84 
Judicature 190  (2001). 
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rating is even higher than the probability for a similarly credentialed Clinton 
nominee.33   
 
The problem arises for those without judicial experience. Here the 
apparent preference for Clinton appointees is strikingly large. Controlling 
for credentials, Clinton nominees have over 10 times better odds of getting a 
unanimous well qualified rating than similarly credentialed Bush appointees. 
Just being nominated by Clinton instead of Bush is a stronger positive 
variable than any other credential or than all other credentials put together.34   
 
These results are consistent with reports from some participants in the 
process of judicial selection. Stephen Calabresi, a Northwestern law 
professor who was involved in judicial selection in the Reagan-Bush era, 
commented, “After the Democrats regained control of the Senate in 1986, 
we made determined efforts to pick sitting federal or state judges for 
appellate court vacancies. We assumed that lower court judges would have 
an easier time being reviewed by the ABA.”35  Asked if this had an effect on 
who was picked, Calabresi said, “Definitely, yes.”36  It is worrisome to think 
that the political preferences of ABA committee members might be driving 
who is selected by a president to serve on the U.S. Court of Appeals. 
 
Even the process of evaluation is different: the ratings of Bush 
nominees can be shown to be related to measurable credentials; the 
evaluation of Clinton nominees cannot. Using multiple logistic regression 
analysis, I explored whether the basic credentials—(1) judicial experience, 
(2) a top-10 law school education, (3) law review, (4) a federal court 
clerkship, (5) private practice experience, and (6) government practice 
experience—were evaluated similarly when considering Bush and Clinton 
appointees. Surprisingly, a Bush appointee with top credentials on five of 
these six criteria (excluding only judicial experience) has a lower chance 
(32%) of getting the highest ABA rating than a Clinton appointee (48%) 
who has none of these six credentials.  
 
If one examines Bush and Clinton nominees separately, one sees that 
Bush nominees face an uphill battle to get the ABA’s highest rating, but 
                                        
 33.  See supra Chart 4. 
 34.  See supra Charts 1-3. 
 35.  Personal communication with Stephen Calabresi, July 11, 2001.   
 36.  Id.   
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winning the battle is based on measured credentials. On the other hand, there 
measured credentials have only a modest effect on the already favorable 
odds that a Clinton nominee will be rated well qualified. The process for 
Bush nominees is substantially objective; the process for Clinton nominees 
is almost entirely subjective.  
 
The differences in how the ABA treats Bush and Clinton nominees 
reaches even to the committee’s internal decision making.  The ABA 
committee split its vote 33% of the time while evaluating Bush appointees, 
but only 17% of the time when evaluating Clinton appointees.37  This 
difference was concentrated among those who lacked prior judicial 
experience, where 50% of Bush appointees had split ratings, compared to 
only 10% of Clinton appointees with split ratings.38  These splits are doubly 
odd because the Clinton appointees were more subjectively evaluated than 
the Bush appointees. This odd unanimity is suggestive of a strong shared 
mindset favoring Clinton appointees without regard to measured credentials. 
 
If Clinton nominees had been evaluated according to the credentials 
and background characteristics (race and gender) used to rate Bush 
appointees (Table 9’s model39), only 36% of Clinton nominees would have 
received the highest ABA rating, rather than the 62% that actually received 
that rating.  Clinton’s nominees would have fared very poorly if they were 
evaluated according to the pattern revealed in the data for Bush nominees.   
 
What if one leaves race and gender effects out of the models and 
sticks just to intellectual and experience credentials?  If Clinton nominees 
had been subjected to the same credentials-driven process that Bush 
candidates were subjected to (Table 4’s model), only 46% of Clinton’s 
nominees would have been unanimously rated as well qualified, rather than 
the 62% that actually received that top rating from the ABA. This 46% is 
nearly identical to the 45% well qualified ratings that George H.W. Bush’s 
nominees actually received from the ABA. In other words, using the 
standards for weighting measured credentials that the ABA applied to the 
                                        
 37.  Significance tests done in the normal fashion met the .05 criterion.  Tests 
done as exact tests miss it slightly: gamma (.061), Pearson’s R (.061), Pearson chi-square 
(.042), Spearman correlation (.061), and Likelihood ratio chi-square (.061).   
 38.  Significance met the .05 criterion: gamma (.021), Pearson’s R (.003), Pearson 
chi-square (.003), Spearman correlation (.003), and Likelihood ratio chi-square (.004).  
 39.  See Appendix, Table 9.   
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Bush nominees, the Bush and Clinton nominees had on average almost 
identically strong qualifications. Yet both groups were not rated identically 
by the American Bar Association.  Despite having no better measured 
credentials than Bush nominees, the Clinton nominees were rated as more 
qualified.  
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 APPENDIX 
 
Table 6 
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating 
From the ABA With Judicial Experience 
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-2000 
 
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=59) 
Dependent Variable: Well Qualified Rating 
-2 Log Likelihood 74.459   
Goodness of Fit 58.481   
Cox & Snell R^2     .057   
Nagelkerke R^2     .078   
Significance      .324                                   
 
Variable   B (log-odds) S.E. Signif.   R    Exponent of B (odds) 
Clinton Nominee  -.467  .584 .424    .000   .627 
Private Practice   .835  .806 .300    .000     2.305 
Govt. Lawyer      1.061  .624 .089    .107     2.890 
Constant        -.524  .946 .580  
 
  
 Table 7 
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating 
From the ABA With Judicial Experience 
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-2000 
 
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=59) 
Dependent Variable: Well Qualified Rating 
-2 Log Likelihood  69.782   
Goodness of Fit  58.190   
Cox & Snell R^2    .129   
Nagelkerke R^2    .176   
Significance     .227 
 
Variable    B (log-odds) S.E. Signif.  R   Exponent of B (odds) 
Clinton Nominee  -.671   .629 .286  .000   .511 
Private Practice   .623   .840 .458  .000     1.865 
Govt. Lawyer       1.145   .681 .093  .106     3.143 
Top 10 JD     .362   .627 .563  .000     1.437 
Law Review     .817   .807 .311  .000     2.264 
Fed. Clerkship  1.371   .875 .117  .078     3.940 
Constant   -.788  .977 .420   
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Table 8 
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating 
From the ABA With Judicial Experience  
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-2000 
 
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=59)  Dependent Var.: Well Qualified  
-2 Log Likelihood 66.028   
Goodness of Fit 58.849   
Cox & Snell R^2     .183   
Nagelkerke R^2     .249   
Significance      .155                                      
 
Variable   B (log-odds)  S.E. Signif.   R  Exponent of B (odds) 
Clinton Nominee    -.662  .710 .351    .000  .516 
Private Practice     .850  .920 .356    .000   2.339 
Govt. Lawyer    1.396  .740 .059    .150   4.038 
Top 10 JD      .303    .653 .642    .000   1.354 
Law Review        .503  .835 .547    .000 1.654 
Fed. Clerkship   1.594  .910 .080    .124 4.925 
Female       .939  .695 .177    .000 2.556 
Minority      -.832  .701 .235    .000   .435 
Constant         -1.154     1.102 .295   
 
Table 9 
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating 
From the ABA For Bush Nominees 
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-1992 
 
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=42)  Dependent Var.: Well Qualified  
-2 Log Likelihood 42.220   
Goodness of Fit 40.930   
Cox & Snell R^2     .311   
Nagelkerke R^2     .415   
Significance      .048 
                                      
Variable B (log-odds)  S.E.  Signif.  R    Exponent of B (odds) 
Judicial Exp.  3.233   1.074  .003   .397   25.350 
Private Practice   .244   1.294  .850   .000     1.276 
Govt. Lawyer    .243     .862  .778   .000     1.275 
Top 10 JD    -.572     .825  .488   .000      .565 
Law Review    .796   1.081  .462   .000    2.216 
Fed. Clerkship   .815   1.104  .460   .000    2.260 
Female   -.527   1.062  .620   .000       .590 
Minority      -2.398   1.623  .140    -.064      .091 
Constant      -2.401   1.546  .120   
Hosted by The Berkeley Electronic Press
August 3, 2001      ABA Ratings of Federal Appellate Nominees       Page 30          
Table 10 
Predicting the Odds of Getting a Well Qualified Rating 
From the ABA For Clinton Nominees 
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1993-2000 
 
Multiple Logistic Regression Analysis (n=66)  Dependent Var.: Well Qualified  
 
-2 Log Likelihood 81.178   
Goodness of Fit 66.243   
Cox & Snell R^2   .092   
Nagelkerke R^2   .126   
Significance    .6025 
 
Variable B (log-odds) S.E. Signif.   R  Exponent of B (odds) 
Judicial Exp.  -.162 .663 .807  .000   .850 
Private Practice -.018 .802 .982  .000   .983 
Govt. Lawyer   .549 .562 .328  .000 1.732 
Top 10 JD  -.010 .564 .986  .000   .990 
Law Review  -.001 .638 .999  .000   .999 
Fed. Clerkship  .911 .618 .141  .045 2.487 
Female           1.063 .663 .109  .082 2.894 
Minority  -.297 .666 .656  .000   .743 
Constant  -.287   1.064 .787   
 
Table 11 
Predicting the ABA Ratings For Nominees Without Judicial 
Experience, Linear Regression Model 
U.S. Court of Appeals Confirmed Nominees, 1989-2000 
 
Multiple Linear Regression Analysis (n=49)  Dependent Var.: ABA 4-point Rating 
 
R: .569         R2: .324 
                                    F        df              Significance 
Model                          2.392      8              .033 
   
Variable                         B           S.E.         Beta            t        Sig          
Clinton Nom    873      .272      .442      3.204   .003 
Private Pract     -.143         .490        -.049               -.293   .771   
Yrs. Priv. Pr. (Stand.) -.033        .171        -.037            -.195   .846 
Government Lwr  -.534         .333        -.279             -1.601  .117 
Yrs. Govt. Pr. (Stand.)  .227        .185       .241          1.225   .228 
Fed. Clerkship   .117         .288       .061           .407   .686   
Law Review    .431      .278       .226            1.552   .129   
Top 10 JD   -.660        .277        -.346         -2.382  .022   
Constant                2.067        .501                             4.129   .000     
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